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I. INTRODUCTION
Trade secrets are important intellectual property.' The National Science
Foundation and the U.S. Census Bureau recently conducted a pilot study for
an expanded Business R&D and Innovation Survey of American businesses.
In 2008, the pilot study indicated that trade secrets were considered impor-
tant by more businesses than copyrights or patents. 2 Yet, the effectiveness of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the Uniform Act),3 which has been enacted
B.W. Young Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. The author
was a Member of the Uniform Law Conference Drafting Committee for the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
1. See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 353 (2008) ("Trade secrets are IP rights.").
2. See John E. Jankowski, Business Use of Intellectual Property Protection Docu-
mented in NSF Survey, INFOBRIEF 1 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.nsf.
gov/statistics/infbrief/nsf12307/nsf12307.pdf. Trademarks also were viewed as
important by more businesses than copyrights or patents. See id. See also Eco-
nomic Espionage, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/counterintelligence/economic-espionage (last visted July 4,
2014) ("The Economic Espionage Unit is dedicated to countering the economic
espionage threat .... ).
3. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005
& Supp. 2013).
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in forty-seven states, 4 has been impaired by a conflict of authority with re-
spect to its scope.5
Section 7 of the 1985 version of the Uniform Act, 6 which has been
widely enacted,7 provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this [Act] displaces con-
flicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State provid-
ing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.
(b) This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misap-
propriation of a trade secret;
(2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropria-
tion of a trade secret; or
(3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappro-
priation of a trade secret.8
4. Versions of the Uniform Act have been enacted in forty-seven states and the
District of Columbia. See Legislative Fact Sheet - Trade Secrets Act, UNIF.
LAW COMM'N, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?tite=Trade
%20Secrets%2OAct (last visited July 4, 2014) (listing the jurisdictions which
have enacted the Act).
5. See James Pooley, TRADE SECRETS § 2.03[6] (1997) ("[T]wo lines of authority
have emerged.").
6. The Uniform Act initially was approved in 1979. Official Amendments were
adopted in 1985. Refer to infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
7. The 1985 version of section 7 has been most widely enacted. Refer to the au-
thority in supra note 4.
8. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985).
The 1979 version of § 7 provided:
(a) This [Act] displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of
this State pertaining to civil liability for misappropriation of a trade
secret.
(b) This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual or other civil liability or relief that is not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret; or
(2) criminal liability for misappropriation of a trade secret.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7, 14 U.L.A. 542 (1979).
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Disputes over Uniform Act Subsection 7(a) "displacement"9 or preemp-
tion of other law of an enacting state are frequently litigatedo and impair the
uniformity that the Act was intended to bring to state trade secret law.",
This article analyzes court decisions under Section 7. It concludes that
greater judicial attention to both the expansive Subsection 1(4)(i) substantive
definition of trade secret and the Restatement (First) of Torts' focus upon
misappropriation of business information are the keys to the proper applica-
tion of Subsection 7(a). Moreover, Subsection 7(b) is not a problem. Amend-
ment of Section 7 is unnecessary.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
The 1939 Restatement (First) of Torts12 was an influential partial formu-
lation of the common-law protection of secret business information.13 But,
due to its specialized nature, trade secret law was omitted from the 1979
Restatement (Second) of Torts.'4 The Uniform Act15 was developed by the
9. The 1979 and 1985 revisions of § 7(a) use the term "displaces" in lieu of
"preempts." See id. Four states have replaced "displaces" with "supersedes."
Refer to infra note 40 and accompanying text.
10. Pooley, supra note 5, § 2.03[6] ("Disputes over UTSA preemption were rela-
tively rare in the years after the UTSA was first promulgated. It has now be-
come a frequently litigated issue.").
11. The 1979 and 1985 Prefatory Note to the Uniform Act states in part:
Like traditional trade secret law, the Uniform Act contains general con-
cepts. The contribution of the Uniform Act is substitution of unitary defi-
nitions of trade secret and trade secret misappropriation, and a single
statute of limitations for the various property, quasi-contractual, and viola-
tion of fiduciary relationship theories of noncontractual liability utilized at
common law.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005).
12. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-59 (1939).
13. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, cmt. b ("Definition of trade secret.
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."). The
Restatement (First) focused upon liability with limited discussion of remedies
and no treatment of the statute of limitations. See also Ramon A. Klitzke, The
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 283 (1980) ("The second
factor limiting the overall effectiveness of the Restatement is that it treated
some areas of trade secrets law inadequately, and others not at all.").
14. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, vol. 4, introductory cmt., at vii-viii
(1979) (stating that trade secret law had become independent of tort law).
15. Refer to supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State LawsI6 to fill the
gap left by the Restatement (Second) through elaboration of the common-law
principles reflected in the 1939 Restatement.17
The Uniform Act initially was approved by the National Conference in
1979.18 Four Official Amendments were adopted 1985,19 one of which re-
vised Section 7.20 In the 1993 Restatement of Unfair Competition, the Ameri-
can Law Institute adopted a definition of common-law trade secret consistent
with the Uniform Act definition.21 To date, six states retain the 1979 version
of the Uniform Act,22 and over forty have enacted the 1985 version.23
16. The National Conference was organized in 1892 to promote desirable and prac-
ticable uniformity in state laws. Commissioners are appointed by each state, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. See 14 U.L.A. prefatory note at iii
(2005).
17. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note, 14 U.L.A. 531 (2005) (stating
that the Uniform Act provides a unified theory of trade secret protection with a
single statute of limitations and appropriate remedies). The Restatement (First)
substantially omitted discussion of remedies and did not address the statute of
limitations. See the authorities in supra notes 18 and 19.
18. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529-659
(2005).
19. See id. The four Amendments were adopted in response to issues raised by the
American Bar Association Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law.
See Action on Resolutions, 1981 PROC. A.B.A. SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK, &
COPYRIGHT L. 30-31. The A.B.A. Section recommended amending § 2(b) to
limit injunctions allowing future use upon payment of a reasonable royalty to
exceptional circumstances, amending § 3 to allow reasonable royalty damages
if neither a plaintiff's actual loss nor a defendant's unjust enrichment were
provable, amending § 7 to make clear that state remedies for breach of contract
were not preempted by the Uniform Act, and amending § I t to clarify that the
Uniform Act does not apply to a continuing misappropriation that began prior
to its effective date. See id. (Resolutions 206-3 to 206-6).
20. Refer to supra note 8 and accompanying text for the wording of the 1979 and
1985 § 7.
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) states "[a] trade
secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or other
enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or
potential economic advantage over others." See also id. cmt. b. ("The concept
of a trade secret as defined in this Section is intended to be consistent with the
definition of 'trade secret' in § 1(4) of the Act.").
22. Refer to infra note 25 and accompanying text.
23. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Table of Jurisdictions, 14 U.L.A. 77, 78 (Supp.
2013) (listing the states which have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
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B. Nonuniform Amendments
James Pooley has commented that "[t]he major drawback of the Uni-
form Trade Secrets Act is that it is not uniform."24 Although the
nonuniformity may not be significant in a particular case, there surely is
nonuniformity. To begin with, 1985 Section 7 has not been adopted in six
states that enacted the 1979 version of the Act.25 Secondly, Iowa, Nebraska,
and New Mexico have omitted Section 7.26
A number of other states have made nonuniform amendments to Section
7. The more important of these states are California, Illinois, New Jersey, and
Texas, which have significant trade secret litigation.
California enacted 1985 Subsection 7(b), substituting the following for
1985 Subsection 7(a): "Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title
does not supersede any statute relating to misappropriation of a trade secret,
or any statute otherwise regulating trade secrets."27
Illinois adopted the 1985 version of Section 7 with two pertinent
nonuniform amendments: (1) "unfair competition" was added to the list of
noncontractual legal claims displaced to the extent of conflict with the Uni-
form Act; and (2) the definition of trade secret in other Illinois statutes was
declared to be unaffected.28 One New Jersey nonuniform amendment moved
24. See Pooley, supra note 5, § 2.03[7][b].
25. Alaska, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Washington have the initial version of § 7.
See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.930 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-602 (2013);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1437 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.900
(West 2013). Connecticut added a nonuniform amendment permitting parties to
agree to opt out of 1979 § 7, and Indiana condensed 1979 § 7. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 35-57(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2013) ("Unless otherwise agreed
by the parties, the provisions of this Chapter supersede .... ); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 24-2-3-1(c) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2012) ("The chapter displaces all con-
flicting law of this state pertaining to the misappropriation of trade secrets,
except contract law and criminal law.").
26. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1-550.8 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 87-501 to 87-507 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1
to 57-3A-7 (2011).
27. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3426.7(a)-(b) (West 2011). California also added
nonuniform § 3426.7(c) stating that the Uniform Act does not affect the disclo-
sure of records by a state or a local agency under the California Public Records
Act. See id. § 3426.7(c), which is irrelevant to the noncontractual claim pre-
emption issue.
28. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065 / 8 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2013). An
extraneous nonuniform amendment to the contractual exception stated that "a
contractual or other duty to maintain secrecy or limit use of a trade secret shall
not be deemed to be void or unenforceable solely for lack of durational or
geographical limitation on the duty." See id. Common-law unfair competition,
which the Illinois nonuniform amendment added to the claims preempted to the
extent of conflict with the Uniform Act, is often held to be preempted. See John
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1985 Subsection 7(a) to Subsection (b), substituting "shall supersede" for
"displaces." Another New Jersey nonuniform amendment replaced the three
1985 Subsection 7(b) express exceptions for contractual remedies, unrelated
civil remedies, and criminal remedies with a single express exception for
actions against public entities and public employees under the New Jersey
Tort Claims Act.29 New Jersey also prefaced 1985 Subsection 7(a) with the
following provision:
The rights, remedies and prohibitions provided under this act are
in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohi-
bition provided under the common law or statutory law of this
State and nothing contained herein shall be construed to deny, ab-
rogate or impair any common law or statutory right, remedy or
prohibition except as expressly provided in subsection b. of this
section .30
On the other hand, there were no material Texas nonuniform
amendments.31
James Pooley predicted that the California nonuniform amendment to
Subsection 7(a) would not result in lesser preemption,32 which has proved to
be the case. 33 But the California substitute replaced the Uniform Act's refer-
T. Cross, UTSA Displacement of Other State Law Claims, 33 HAMLINE L. REV.
445, 467 & n.82 (2010) (stating that there is no consensus, but citing numerous
cases preempting unfair competition claims).
29. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-9(b) to (c) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013).
30. See id. § 56:15-9(a).
31. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.007 (West Supp. 2013). Im-
material Texas nonuniform amendments stated that the Uniform Act controls
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, that the Texas Supreme Court cannot adopt
rules in conflict with the Uniform Act (see id. § 134A.007(c)) and that the
Uniform Act does not affect the disclosure of public information by govern-
mental bodies (see id. § 134A.007(d)).
32. See James H. Pooley, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: California Civil Code
3426, 1 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 193, 208-09 (1985)
("Therefore, the somewhat different language used in the California version of
the statute should be interpreted to indicate that nonstatutory theories for trade
secret protection do not remain available, at least not where the result would be
an evasion of the procedural protections and definitions provided by the Act.").
33. See, e.g., Sunpower Corp. v. Solarcity Corp., No. 12-CV-00694-LHK, 2012
WL 6160472 *1, *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (dismissing claims for
breach of confidence, conversion, trespass to chattels, tortious interference with
prospective business advantage, common-law unfair competition and statutory
unfair competition). See also Ernest Paper Prods., Inc. v. Mobil Chem. Co., No.
CV95-7918-LGB (AJWX), 1997 WL 33483520 *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 1997)
(stating that "the California legislature did not omit § 7 entirely, but rather re-
wrote it, compatibly with preemptive intent.").
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ence to "displacing" conflicting law with a reference to "not superseding"
other California statutes dealing with trade secrets. 34 California cases accord-
ingly analyze whether there has been "supersession" of noncontractual legal
claims.35 Finally, notwithstanding their other nonuniform amendments, Illi-
nois and New Jersey accepted the Uniform Act policy of preempting con-
flicting noncontractual legal claims.36
Arkansas excepted,37 three of the states that retain the 1979 version of
Section 7, plus Connecticut and Indiana, which modified 1979 Section 7,
have enacted the Uniform Act uniformity clause,38 stating that the Act "shall
be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform
the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] among states enacting it."39
The uniformity clause should make well-reasoned decisions under 1985 Sec-
tion 7 persuasive in these five states.4 0
34. Refer to supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 47-51 & n.14
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010), disapproved of on other grounds, Kwikset Corp. v. Supe-
rior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 895 (Cal. 2011). Connecticut, Georgia, and New
Jersey nonuniform amendments also substituted "supersede" for "displaces."
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-57(a) (West 2005 & Supp.. 2013); GA. CODE
ANN. tit. § 10-1-767(a) (2009 & Supp. 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-9(b)
(West 2012 & Supp. 2013). Courts applying the law of these states accordingly
refer to "supersession." See, e.g., Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540
F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 2007) ("[T]he rule of supersession is guided
by the purpose of the constraints imposed by the GTSA .... ") (applying Geor-
gia law).
36. See 765 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065 / 8(a) (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2013);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56-9(b) (West 2012 & Supp. 2013). On the other hand, New
Jersey nonuniform § 7(b) omits the Uniform Act exclusion from preemption of
contractual remedies, unrelated civil remedies, and criminal remedies. Com-
pare UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005) and supra note 3
accompanying text, with the New Jersey provisions referred to in supra notes
29 and 30 and accompanying text. Moreover, an unrelated New Jersey
nonuniform amendment could be misapplied to undercut New Jersey's accept-
ance of the Uniform Act policy on preemption. See infra notes 46-49 and ac-
companying text.
37. See ARK CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 through 4-75-607 (2011).
38. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.935 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-58 (West
2005 & Supp. 2013); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3-1(b) (LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1438 (2012 & Supp. 2013); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 19.108.910 (West 2013).
39. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 656 (2005).
40. Cf Silvaco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 48-49 (stating that California's enactment of
the Uniform Act uniformity clause supported the conclusion that the Act was
intended to occupy the field of trade secret liability).
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Iowa, Nebraska, and New Mexico, the three states that omitted Section
7 entirely, plus Arkansas, omitted the Section 8 uniformity clause.4 1 But, de-
pending upon the reasons for omission of these clauses, the general adoption
of the Uniform Act by these four states could make well-reasoned decisions
under 1985 Section 7 persuasive in them. Nebraska, for example, omitted
Section 7 because there were no existing Nebraska statutes or cases in con-
flict with the Uniform Act,42 a rationale that is consistent with Uniform Act
preemption .43
There are more nonuniform amendments than would exist in an ideal
world. But, Iowa, New Mexico, and the states that have not enacted the Uni-
form Act excepted, the core Uniform Act preemption provisions apply
throughout the country.
II. THE SCOPE OF UNIFORM ACT PREEMPTION
A. The Justification for Trade Secret Protection
Like patent and copyright law, trade secret law encourages the develop-
ment and use of valuable business information. Trade secret law reduces the
need to invest substantial amounts in physical security and protects the confi-
dential disclosure of secret business information.44 But, the secrecy of busi-
ness information must be required for protection or trade secret law will
exceed its justification and unduly restrict employee mobility.45 The most
41. See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1 through 550.8 (West 2011); NEB. RFv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 87-501 through 87-507 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 57-3A-1 through 57-3A-7 (2011).
42. See Gerald B. Buechler, Jr., Revealing Nebraska's Trade Secret Act, 23
CREIGHTON L. REv. 323, 328-29 & n.31 (1989) (stating that the absence of
existing cases and statutes made § 7 "simply unnecessary" in Nebraska).
43. But see 205 Corp. v. Brandow, 517 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (Iowa 1994) (stating
that the Iowa enactment "has not preempted all tort theories involving trade
secrets"). In Brandow, the plaintiff, a restaurant that claimed a competing res-
taurant had obtained its secret recipes from a former employee, had recovered a
$145,000 jury verdict upon a trade secret misappropriation claim and a
$195,000 jury verdict upon an inducement of breach of the duty of loyalty
claim. If the Uniform Act had preempted the alternative noncontractual claim,
the plaintiff's recovery would have been limited to the $145,000 verdict upon
the trade secret misappropriation claim. But the Iowa Supreme Court refused to
allow preemption due to the Iowa legislature's failure to enact § 7. See id.
Nevertheless, because the two claims were duplicative, the Court remanded the
case for amendment of the judgment to allow a $195,000 recovery upon the
inducement of breach of loyalty claim alone. See id. at 551.
44. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 329-41 (arguing that trade secret rights, like pat-
ent and copyright rights, encourage inventive activity and disclosure of
inventions).
45. See id. at 342-44 (Requiring proof of the secrecy of business information "is
critical to ensuring that trade secret law does not interfere with robust competi-
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potentially harmful nonuniform amendments consequently focus upon a de-
fendant's conduct rather than upon the business information for which pro-
tection is sought. A New Jersey nonuniform amendment, for example, states
that: "A person who misappropriates a trade secret shall not use as a defense
to the misappropriation that proper means to acquire the trade secret existed
at the time of the misappropriation."46
This nonuniform amendment literally does not relieve a plaintiff of the
necessity of proving the existence of a trade secret in order to obtain relief.
But, the nonuniform amendment could be construed as deleting "not being
readily ascertainable by proper means" from the Uniform Act definition of
trade secret.47 Should this unfortunate development occur, New Jersey trade
secret law could protect business information that was not secret. 48 However,
if New Jersey went so far as to protect nonsecret technical business informa-
tion that was in the public domain, the misapplication of the New Jersey
statute would be preempted by the federal patent laws.49
B. The Uniform Act Definition of Trade Secret
The core of the Uniform Act is its definition of trade secret. Subsection
1(4) of both the 1979 and 1985 versions states:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compi-
lation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
tion or with the dissemination of new ideas."); Edmund W. Kitch, The Expan-
sion of Trade Secrecy Protection and the Mobility of Management Employees:
A New Problem for the Law, 47 S.C. L. REV. 659, 664-67 (1996) (discussing
the impact of increased trade secret rights upon employee mobility).
46. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-5 (West 2012 & Supp. 2013).
47. Refer to infra note 50 and accompanying text for the Uniform Act definition of
trade secret.
48. See HDNet, LLC. v. N. Am. Boxing Council, 972 N.E.2d 920, 925 (Ind. Ct.
App.), transfer denied, 980 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. 2012) (citing Professor Lemley's
article for the proposition that allowing noncontractual legal claims to protect
business information that is not secret would negate the secrecy requirement).
49. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979) ("We have
held that a state may not forbid the copying of an idea in the public domain
which does not meet the requirements for federal patent protection."). Cf
Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, USTA Preemption and the Public
Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law
Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 103-05, 108
(2012) (The majority approach to UTSA preemption is consistent with the fed-
eral patent laws but applications of the minority approach could conflict with
those laws.). See also Sharon K. Sandeen, Kewanee Revisited: Returning to
First Principles of Intellectual Property Law To Determine the Issue of Federal
Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 299, 346 (2008) (identifying
factors that courts should consider in determining whether state law is pre-
empted by the federal patent and copyright laws).
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i. derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by
proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use, and
ii. is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances
to maintain its secrecy.5 0
The two aspects of the definition are not of equal significance. Sub (ii)
deals with whether a particular plaintiff has standing to maintain an action
for trade secret misappropriation.5 On the other hand, Sub (i) requires that
business information derive actual or potential independent economic value
from secrecy in order to be protected.52 The Restatement (First) requirement
that a trade secret must be continuously used by a business,53 however, is
omitted. In 1993, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition also re-
moved a continuous business use requirement from common law trade secret
misappropriation.54
50. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
51. The existence of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy also is some evidence
that information is secret. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b
(1939) (stating that the factors to be considered in determining the existence of
a trade secret include "the extent of measures taken ... to guard the secrecy of
the information").
52. The drafting history of the Uniform Act indicates that the statutory reference to
"economic value" is synonymous with "commercial value." See Sharon K.
Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L.
REV. 493, 524-26 (2010). Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757
cmt. b (1939) ("Definition of trade secret (A trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over com-
petitors who do not know or use it.")), with Klitzke, supra note 19, at 287
("The Uniform Trade Secrets Act ... [includes] 'business information' as de-
fined in the Restatement, in its broad definition of a trade secret as
information.").
53. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) ("A trade secret is a
process or device for continuous use in the operation of the business.").
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (1995) (stat-
ing that the Restatement definition is consistent with the Uniform Act defini-
tion); see also id. cmt. d ("The definition ... in this Section . . . contains no
requirement that the information afford a continuous or long-term advantage.").
The Restatement of Unfair Competition also recognizes that nonprofit entities,
including charitable, educational, fraternal and religious organizations, can
claim trade secret protection for "economically valuable information such as
lists of prospective members or donors." See id. at 429. This article refers to the
subject matter of trade secrets as "business information," but there is no inten-
tion to preclude application of the Uniform Act to valuable or potentially valua-
ble secret information of nonprofit entities.
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The broad Sub (i) definition of trade secret encompasses all business
information with independent economic value and renders alternative non-
contractual legal claims conflicting.55 This is illustrated by the American
Law Institute's treatment of the Uniform Act.
In addition to Section 757 on trade secrets, the Restatement (First) of
Torts contained Section 759 dealing with procuring business information for
a rival business purpose by improper means. Section 759 stated: "One who,
for the purpose of advancing a rival business interest, procures by improper
means information about another's business is liable to the other for the harm
caused by his possession, disclosure or use of the information."56 Comment b
added: "[I]f the improper discovery of the information is to cause harm, the
information must be of a secret or confidential character."57
Professor Edmund Kitch summed up the differences between Restate-
ment (First) Sections 757 and 759 as follows:
First, an injunction was available as remedy only against misap-
propriation of a trade secret, not against use of information pro-
cured by improper means. Second, remedies were available
against third parties who acquired a trade secret with knowledge
or reason to know that it was a trade secret, but not against third
parties who came into possession of information improperly pro-
cured by someone else. Third, the protection against improper
procurement of information only applied if the information was
improperly procured "for the purpose of advancing a rival busi-
ness interest. 58
Restatement (First) Section 759 was necessary because Restatement
(First) trade secrets had to be in continuous use by a business.59 In conjunc-
tion with dropping the continuous use requirement, the Restatement (Third)
dropped Section 759. A Comment to Restatement (Third) Section 41 dealing
with the duty of confidence explained:
Some courts have recognized liability in tort for the unauthorized
disclosure of confidential business information found to be ineligi-
55. See Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 664 (N.H. 2006) (ex-
plaining that the statute "essentially creates a system in which information is
classified only as a protected trade secret or unprotected general . . .knowl-
edge" (internal quotations omitted)). Accord Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp.,
109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, n.22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) ("[I]nformation that does not fit
this definition [of trade secret] and is not otherwise made property by some
provision of positive law, belongs to no one, and cannot be converted or
stolen.").
56. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 759 (1939).
57. See id. cmt. b.
58. Kitch, supra note 45, at 661-62.
59. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b.
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ble for protection as a trade secret. In some cases the claim is
designated as one for "breach of confidence," while in others it is
described as one for "unfair competition." Many of these cases
rest on a narrow definition of "trade secret" that excludes non-
technical information such as customer identities or information
that is not subject to continuous, long-term use. Such information
is now subsumed under the broader definition of "trade secret"
adopted in § 39.60
The Restatement (Third)'s merger of the Restatement (First)'s concept
of protectable confidential information into the Restatement (Third)'s defini-
tion of trade secret illustrates the scope of the Uniform Act preemption provi-
sions. Under both the Restatement (Third) and the Uniform Act, a tort claim
for misuse of confidential information no longer exists with respect to busi-
ness information that is not a trade secret. 6'
C. The 1979 and 1985 Subsection 7(a) Preemption Provisions
1979 subsection 7(a) provides: "(a) This [Act] displaces conflicting tort,
restitutionary, and other law of this State pertaining to civil liability for mis-
appropriation of a trade secret."62 There is no statutory definition of "con-
flicting law," but it is inherently conflicting for a noncontractual legal claim
to treat business information differently than the Uniform Act. 63 There are
two principal types of conflicting noncontractual legal claims: claims protect-
ing business information that does not qualify as a Uniform Act trade secret,
and claims providing different remedies for business information that is a
Uniform Act trade secret.
Both types of noncontractual legal claims would enable parties to cir-
cumvent the Uniform Act. Protecting business information that does not
qualify as a Uniform Act trade secret would make the Uniform Act definition
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 41 cmt. c. See also Poo-
ley, supra note 5, § 3.04[5] at 3-47 (If the information to be protected cannot
be characterized under the extremely broad definition of modem trade secret
law, then there is arguably little social utility in permitting the claim.).
61. With respect to the Restatement (Third), see Pooley, supra note 5, § 3.04[5] at
2-35 (By defining a duty of confidence only in terms of trade secrets, the Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition implicitly rejects the suggestion by the
Restatement of Torts that a separate claim exists for "breach of confidence" as
to matter that does not qualify as a trade secret.). With respect to the Uniform
Act, see the Uniform Act definition of "trade secret," supra notes 50-55 and
accompanying text.
62. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005).
63. See Cross, supra note 28, at 471 ("First, and most obviously, that state law
might conflict by generating an outcome different than that which the party
would obtain under the UTSA.").
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of trade secret irrelevant.64 Providing different remedies for Uniform Act
trade secrets would make the Uniform Act remedies irrelevant. James Poo-
ley, for example, has commented: "If... a party could obtain fivefold puni-
tive damages without having to establish trade secrecy by pleading an
alternative claim, there might be little incentive to assert statutory
misappropriation."65
Both types of conflicting noncontractual legal claims "pertain to" mis-
appropriation of Uniform Act trade secrets and are displaced by the 1979
Official Text of Subsection 7(a).66
1985 Subsection 7(a) states: "Except as provided in subsection (b), this
[Act] displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State pro-
viding civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret."67 The 1985
Amendment replacing "pertaining to" with "providing for" in the sense of
"dealing with" was not a substantive change. Burbank Grease Services, LLC
v. Sokolowski,68 a Wisconsin decision,69 for example, acknowledged that this
"plain language" .... . appears to have the effect of making ... [the Wiscon-
sin enactment] the exclusive remedy for civil claims based on the misappro-
priation of a statutorily defined trade secret."70
64. See Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1345 (N.D.
Ga 2007) ("And it would make little sense to go through the rigmarole of prov-
ing that information was truly a trade secret if a plaintiff could alternatively
plead claims with less burdensome requirements of proof. Since such an at-
tempt to circumvent those requirements would be 'in conflict' with the man-
dates of the GTSA, the GTSA renders such clams superseded.").
65. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 634 (2005).
See Pooley, supra note 5, § 2.03[6] at 2.30.1. The Uniform Act limits punitive
damages to two times compensatory damages.
66. But see I ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 1.01 [3][a] at 1-240.14(78) (2012) (stating that interpreting the Uni-
form Act to preempt alternative remedies for misappropriation of business in-
formation that does not satisfy the Uniform Act definition of trade secret may
bar relief that is required by "principles of commercial morality."). However,
the principal justification for trade secret law is encouragement of invention
and dissemination of valuable business information, not promoting commercial
morality. Refer to supra note 44 and accompanying text.
67. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005).
It is submitted that the two versions are substantially the same with the excep-
tion of the replacement of "pertaining to" by "providing for." Compare id. and
accompanying text with supra note 62.
68. Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2006).
69. See Cross, supra note 28, at 451 (Burbank Grease is "[p]erhaps the most-dis-
cussed" minority approach case.).
70. Burbank Grease, 717 N.W.2d at 789.
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Indeed, because Uniform Act trade secrets include all business informa-
tion with independent value derived from secrecy, 7 1 its "plain language"
makes the Uniform Act the exclusive remedy for misappropriation of all val-
uable nonpublic business information.72
D. Subsection 7(a) in the Courts
There is a conflict of authority under Subsection 7(a).73 Under the "mi-
nority approach," Uniform Act preemption exists only if business informa-
tion is a Uniform Act trade secret.74 If there is no Uniform Act trade secret,
there is no preemption.75 Because the existence of a Uniform Act trade secret
ordinarily is a question of fact,76 minority approach preemption typically can-
not be decided upon the pleadings.77 More importantly, the minority ap-
proach, which can be summarized as the No Uniform Act Trade Secret, No
Preemption View,78 conflicts with the Uniform Act by allowing noncontrac-
71. Refer to supra note 55 and accompanying text.
72. See id. The Burbank Grease majority opinion disagreed. See Burbank Grease,
717 N.W.2d at 798 (The Wisconsin enactment does not preclude a civil remedy
for misappropriation of confidential information that is not a trade secret.). But
the majority failed to realize that all confidential information with actual or
potential commercial value is a trade secret. See Graves & Tippett, supra note
49, at 101 ("Inasmuch as courts following the minority position on UTSA pre-
emption seek to wedge state tort claims interstitially between the statute's defi-
nition and federal patent law's defined public domain, we find no space for
doing so."). Refer also to supra note 55 and accompanying text.
73. See Pooley, supra note 5, § 2.03[6] at 2-30 ("[T]wo lines of authority have
emerged.").
74. See id. at § 2.03[6] at 2-30 (stating that, under the minority approach, preemp-
tion exists only if the information at issue is a UTSA trade secret).
75. See, e.g., Burbank Grease, 717 N.W.2d at 788, 796, 798 (stating that the plain-
tiff corporation not having a Uniform Act trade secret, its alternative non-con-
tractual legal claims for breach of the duty of loyalty, aiding and abetting
breach of the duty of loyalty, interference with business relationships, and con-
spiring to interfere with business relationships were not preempted). The Bur-
bank Grease majority opinion was influenced by a Wisconsin nonuniform
amendment to Uniform Act § 7(b)(2) that excepted "any civil remedy not
based upon misappropriation of a trade secret." See id. at 788-90.
76. See, e.g., CDC Restoration & Constr., LC. v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC,
274 P.3d 317, 323 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) ("What constitutes a trade secret is a
question of fact.").
77. See, e.g., Stone Castle Fin., Inc. v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., 191 F.
Supp. 2d 652, 658-59 (E.D. Va. 2002) (stating that, "unless it can be clearly
discerned that the information in question constitutes a trade secret, the Court
cannot dismiss alternative theories of relief as preempted by the VUTSA").
78. The minority approach also has been called the Trade Secret Only view. See
Cross, supra note 28, at 451.
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tual legal claims to protect business information that is not a Uniform Act
trade secret. 79 The minority approach is preempted by 1979 and 1985 Sub-
section 7(a).80 Applications of the minority approach that protect public tech-
nical business information also conflict with the federal patent laws.81
The majority approach preempts noncontractual legal claims protecting
business information, whether or not the business information is a Uniform
Act trade secret.82 The majority approach, which can be summarized as the
Exclusive Remedy for Misappropriation of Business Information View,83
permits but does not require preemption to be resolved upon the pleadings.84
In order to determine whether a noncontractual legal claim protects bus-
iness information, a court must parse the factual allegations in the pleadings
with respect to a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings. With respect to a motion for summary judgment, a court must parse the
record evidence as well. In BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC. v. Hawaiian Elec.
Co.,85 the Hawaii Supreme Court stated "The majority of courts ...have
rejected the 'elements' test and have instead examined the factual allegations
underlying each claim to determine whether a claim, whatever its label, is
79. Refer to supra note 64 and accompanying text.
80. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005);
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr § 7(a), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1979).
81. See Graves & Tippett, supra note 49, at 102-05 (Enjoining a former employee
and his or her new employer from use of public technical information is plainly
inconsistent with federal patent law.). See also Sandeen, supra note 49, at
354-57) (identifying factors that courts should consider in determining whether
state law is preempted by the federal patent and copyright laws).
82. See, e.g., Penalty Kick Mgmt. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284, 1296-98
(11 th Cir. 2003) (stating that noncontractual claims were preempted because
the plaintiff had a Uniform Act trade secret); Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision
Network, LLC, 144 F. Supp. 2d 784, 788-89 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (holding that
the UTSA preempts alternative noncontractual legal claims protecting business
information that is not a UTSA trade secret). Under the majority view, preemp-
tion applies even though a plaintiff pleads only noncontractual legal claims and
omits a claim for trade secret misappropriation. See, e.g., PHA Lighting De-
sign, Inc. v. Kosheluk, No. l:08-CV-01208-JOF, 2010 WL 1328754 at
10- 11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 30, 2010) (preempting unjust enrichment and conver-
sion claims even though there was no claim of trade secret misappropriation).
83. The majority approach also has been called the All Confidential Information
view. See Cross, supra note 28, at 452.
84. See, e.g., BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC. v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 235 P.3d 310, 324
(Haw. 2010) (holding that preemption is appropriate at the motion to dismiss
stage); CDC Restoration & Constr., LC. v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 274
P.3d 317, 322, 330 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (adopting the Exclusive Remedy for
Misappropriation of Business Information View at the summary judgment
stage).
85. BlueEarth Biofuels, 235 P.3d at 310.
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based upon misappropriation of a trade secret."86 The BlueEarth court was
right about the necessity for factual analysis but misdescribed the precise
factual inquiry, which is whether a noncontractual legal claim protects busi-
ness information from misappropriation, whether or not the business infor-
mation is a Uniform Act trade secret.87
E. Majority Approach Subsection 7(a) Preemption
Majority approach preemption must be invoked with precision. Noncon-
tractual legal claims protecting business information from misappropriation
alone are preempted. Allegations and proof of other wrongdoing are not. For
example, in Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey,88 the trial court had dis-
missed all a former employer's claims except trade secret misappropriation
and the jury had found for the former employees and their new employer on
that claim.89 Upon appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the
trial judge's decision not to set aside the jury verdict in favor of the defend-
ants on the trade secret misappropriation claim.90 The supreme court then
parsed the allegations in the former employer's pleadings with respect to
claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with
advantageous relations, and violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Pro-
tection Act. The conversion and breach of fiduciary duty claims were based
solely upon the misappropriation of customer information. Their dismissal
86. See id. at 316-17.
87. See, e.g., Diamond Power Int'l Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322,
1343-48 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (preempting the plaintiff's claims for conversion,
unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, tor-
tious interference with business relations, and tortious interference with con-
tractual relations even though some of the information claimed to be a trade
secret was not and a fact issue existed as to whether the plaintiff had any trade
secrets on motion for summary judgment); Madison Oslin, Inc. v. Interstate
Res., Inc., No. 2:11 -CV-01343-SLB, 2012 WL 4730877 at *7-10 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 30, 2012) (preempting claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, breach
of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and suppression on motion to dismiss);
BlueEarth Biofuels, 235 P.3d at 323 (answering a certified question, holding
"that the HUTSA preempts noncontract civil claims based on the improper ac-
quisition, disclosure, or use of confidential, and/or commercially valuable in-
formation that does not rise to the level of a statutorily-defined trade secret");
CDC Restoration, 274 P.3d at 330 (affirming summary judgment for the de-
fendants and holding that the Uniform Act preempts claims based upon the
unauthorized use of information, whether or not the information meets the stat-
utory definition of a trade secret). Refer also to supra note 55 and accompany-
ing text.
88. Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652 (N.H. 2006).
89. See id. at 767-68.
90. See id. at 772.
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was affirmed.91 However, the claims for tortious interference with advanta-
geous relations and violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection
Act contained additional allegations with respect to contacting the former
employer's customers and persuading them to do business with the defend-
ants. The defendants, for example, were alleged to have asserted that their
former employer was not properly licensed in New Hampshire. The defend-
ants also were alleged to have solicited their former employer's employees.
The dismissal of the claims for tortious interference with advantageous rela-
tions and violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act was re-
versed and the claims remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.92
Hecny Transportation, Inc. v. Chu,93 a Seventh Circuit case, illustrates
what is not preempted by the majority approach. Hecny, the U.S. subsidiary
of a Hong Kong corporation, sued Chu, a former manager in its Chicago
office, Chu's wife, and a second Hecny employee. Judge Easterbrook de-
scribed the U.S. subsidiary's complaint as follows:
Hecny's complaint charges Chu with diverting its assets (its phys-
ical plant, its employees' time, and its information such as cus-
tomer lists) to competing businesses, which Chu allowed to
operate from Hecny's premises. These activities may be classified
as the diversion of corporate opportunities, as fiduciary defalca-
tions, and as outright theft. (Hecny adds that when Chu left he
took files, computers, software, and other office equipment with
him, adding theft of physical assets to theft of business.)94
91. See id. at 780-82. Accord Diamond Power, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 1343-48 (grant-
ing summary judgment of preemption with respect to claims for conversion,
unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, tor-
tious interference with business relations, and tortious interference with con-
tractual relations); BlueEarth Biofuels, 235 P.3d at 324 ("For those claims
found to conflict with the HUTSA, the scope of displacement is complete.
However, a claim may survive to the extent that it alleges wrongful conduct
independent of the misappropriation of trade secrets."); CDC Restoration, 274
P.3d at 331-33 (affirming summary judgment of preemption with respect to
claims for breach of fiduciary duty, intentional interference with economic re-
lations, and civil conspiracy).
92. See Mortgage Specialists, 904 A.2d at 666-68. To the extent that the tortious
interference and violation of the New Hampshire Consumer Protection Act
claims were based upon the misappropriation of customer information, their
dismissal was affirmed. See id. Accord Prof'I Energy Mgmt., Inc. v. Necaise,
684 S.E.2d 374, 377-80 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (reversing dismissal of a former
employer's breach of fiduciary duty by a former employee, tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations, conversion, unjust enrichment, and constructive
trust claims to the extent that the claims were based upon conduct other than
misuse of business information).
93. Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402 (7th Cir. 2005).
94. See id. at 403-04.
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The trial judge ruled that Hecny had no protectable trade secrets and
that Hecny's other claims were preempted by the Illinois enactment.95 The
Seventh Circuit reversed. According to Judge Easterbrook:
If Hecny had put its customer list on its website for the world to
ogle, that would not have permitted its managers to go into covert
competition using Hecny's own depot and staff, or to walk off
with computers and fax machines, as Hecny alleges Chu did.
Trade secrets just have nothing to do with Hecny's principal
claims.96
An Illinois federal district court described the Hecny test for preemption
as "whether the plaintiff's claim would lie if the information at issue were
nonconfidential,"97 i.e., not a trade secret. But this misinterprets the Hecny
case. Judge Easterbrook held that Hecny's noncontractual legal claims could
be maintained because they were not being used to protect business informa-
tion from misappropriation.98
F. The 1979 and 1985 Subsection 7(b) Exceptions to Preemption
1985 Subsection 7(b) provides:
(b) This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misap-
propriation of a trade secret;
(2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropria-
tion of a trade secret; or
95. See Hecny Transp., Inc. v. Chu, 98 C 7335, 2004 WL 725466 at *2-3 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 31, 2004), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 430 F.3d 402 (7th Cir.
2005).
96. See Hecny, 430 F.3d at 404. Rubloff Dev. Group, Inc. v. SuperValu, Inc., 863
F. Supp. 2d 732,751 (N.D. Ill. 2012) explained this passage in Hecny as
follows:
The court's language of "trade secrets just have nothing to do with
Hecny's principal claims" indicates that the court was assailing the notion
that just because one is not guilty of trade secret violations , he is not
granted immunity for unrelated torts, which was essentially what the Dis-
trict Court had ruled.
97. See, e.g., RTC Indus., Inc. v. Haddon, 06 C 5734, 2007 WL 2743583 at *2-3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2007).
98. See Hecny, 430 F.3d at 404 ("Trade secrets just have nothing to do with
Hecny's principal claims."). Accord Fast Food Gourmet, Inc. v. Little Lady
Foods, Inc., 05 C 6022, 2006 WL 1460461 at *2 (N.D. I11. Apr. 6, 2006) (hold-
ing that unjust enrichment claim for unauthorized use of the plaintiff's equip-
ment had nothing to do with the misuse of business information).
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(3) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappro-
priation of a trade secret.99
The principal difference between the two versions is that 1985 Subsec-
tion 7(b)(1) expressly excepts from preemption "contractual remedies,
whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret;"0o whereas
1979 Subsection 7(b)(l) is less explicit.101 Both versions emphasize that the
broad Uniform Act definition of trade secret102 does not limit the contractual
and criminal remedies exceptions to preemption.103 Both versions also are
accompanied by a Commissioners' Comment explaining that the Uniform
Act does not apply to voluntarily-assumed contractual duties pertaining to
trade secrets, including covenants not to disclose and covenants not to
compete. 104
On the other hand, neither 1979 nor 1985 Subsection 7(b)(1) allows
parties to create Uniform Act trade secrets by contractual fiat. For example,
in Sun Media Systems, Inc. v. KDSM, LLC.,105 decided by a federal district
court under the Iowa enactment, the plaintiff cited the following confidential-
ity clause in its contract with the defendant as evidence of the existence of
trade secrets:
[KDSM] hereby acknowledge[s] that any marketing, sales, pro-
motional or production information, manuals, customer lists, art-
work, methods of operation or material it may acquire from [Sun
99. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651 (2005).
100. The 1979 version of § 7(b) stated:
(b) This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual or other civil liability or relief that is not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret; or
(2) criminal liability for misappropriation of a trade secret.
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(b), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1979).
101. See id. But see Pooley, supra note 5, § 2.03[6] at 2-26 and 2-27 (1985 § 7 has a
"narrower preemption clause.").
102. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
104. The Commissioners' Comment provides in part:
This ActFalsedoes not apply to dties a duty voluntarily assumed through
an express or an implied-in-fact contract. The enforceability of covenants
not to disclose trade secrets and covenants not to compete that are in-
tended to protect trade secrets, for example, are is governed by other law.
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651
(2005) (showing 1985 insertions underlined and 1985 deletions struck
through).
105. Sun Media Sys., Inc. v. KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946 (S.D. Iowa 2008),
recons. den., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (S.D. Iowa 2008).
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Media] in the performance of or in connection with or as a result
of this Agreement are [Sun Media's] trade secrets.106
The federal district judge responded: "Plaintiff cannot. . . use the confi-
dentiality clause in the KDSM contract to turn items into trade secrets that
simply are not trade secrets under applicable law."107
A second issue with respect to the contractual exception from preemp-
tion is whether a tort action for intentional interference with a nondisclosure
contract is preempted. At least four cases so hold this proposition. The ratio-
nale of Hauck Manufacturing v. Astec Industries, Inc.,08 a federal district
court case applying the Tennessee enactment, is typical:
Count IV of Plaintiff's amended complaint charges Astec with the
common law tort of tortious interference with contract . . .while
Count V charges Astec with the statutory tort of unlawful procure-
ment of breach of contractFalseThe specific contractual provisions
at issue (and, for that matter, the contracts as a whole), the nature
and manner of the alleged breach, and the alleged harm to Plaintiff
all relate exclusively to the disclosure of secret, confidential, and/
or proprietary information to Astec. As such, it would appear
Plaintiff's tortious interference and unlawful procurement claims
are preempted, at least to the extent they rely on the confidential-
ity agreements. 09
Mobile Mark, Inc. v. Pakosz,110 a federal district court case under the
Illinois enactment, used a similar rationale to preempt a tort claim for con-
spiracy to breach a trade secret agreement."'
106. See id. at 965.
107. See id.; Pooley, supra note 5, § 2.03[6] at 2-28 ("[E]ven though the Uniform
Act expressly preservescontractual remedies, this does not mean that one may
protect through contract that which does not qualify as a trade secret."); MIL-
GRIM & BENSEN, supra note 66, § 4.02[1][b] at 4-21 ("The mere presence of a
confidentiality agreement does not elevate nontrade secret matter to trade secret
status."). On the other hand, a nondisclosure agreement is evidence that a plain-
tiff has taken reasonable steps to maintain secrecy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. g, at 435 (stating that a nondisclosure
agreement can emphasize the confidential nature of information).
108. Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).
109. See id. at 659. Accord Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d
968, 976 (N.D. I11. 2000); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d
911, 993-94 (C.D. Cal. 2011); BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC. v. Hawaiian Elec.
Co., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1076-77 (D. Haw. 2011).
110. Mobil Mark, Inc. v. Pakosz, No. 11 C 2983, 2011 WL 3898032 (N.D. I11. Sept.
6, 2011).
Ill. See id. at *4-5.
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A Wisconsin variation of the 1985 Subsection 7(b)(2) exception was a
stated justification for a Wisconsin Supreme Court majority's 2006 adoption
of the minority No Uniform Act Trade Secret, No Preemption View in the
Burbank Grease case."12 The Wisconsin enactment had replaced the 1985
exception of "other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation
of a trade secret" with the exception of "any civil remedy not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret."' 13 The Wisconsin Supreme Court major-
ity commented "'Any' is a very broad term. Accordingly, we conclude that
its use evinces a broad range of civil remedies that are not precluded. ... 114
The majority held that Wisconsin Section 7 did not preempt a tort remedy for
the misappropriation of confidential business information that did not qualify
as a Uniform Act trade secret.1 5 This conclusion was not justified by the
minor Wisconsin nonuniform amendment emphasized by the majority. More-
over, the conclusion was contradicted by the majority's acknowledgement
that the Wisconsin enactment was the exclusive remedy for the misappropri-
ation of Uniform Act trade secrets. 116 The majority failed to realize that the
expansive Uniform Act definition of trade secret had superseded prior Wis-
consin cases treating protection of confidential business information as dis-
tinct from trade secret misappropriation.]"7
1985 Subsection 7(b)(3) states that the Uniform Act does not displace
criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade
secret.]18 Over half the states and the federal government have enacted crimi-
nal penalties for trade secret theft.19 Subsection 7(b)(3) applies to the crimi-
nal statutes in an enacting state.
There have been no significant issues with respect to the exception from
preemption of state criminal statutes. However, under the Indiana
nonuniform version of 1979 Subsection 7(b),120 the Indiana Court of Appeals
has rendered two decisions with respect to the preemption of state civil reme-
dies for criminal conduct. AGS Capital Corp. v. Product Action Interna-
112. The Burbank Grease interpretation of 1985 § 7(a) is discussed at supra notes
68-72 and accompanying text.
113. Compare the 1985 Uniform Act exception at supra note 99 and accompanying
text, with the Wisconsin statute referred to in Burbank Grease Servs., LLC v.
Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 788 (Wis. 2006).
114. Id. at 789.
115. See id. at 798.
116. Refer to supra note 69-72 and accompanying text.
117. Refer to supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 99 and accompanying text for the text of 1985 subsection
7(b)(3).
119. See Pooley, supra note 5, §§ 13.02, 13.03. The principal federal statute is the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996. See id. at § 13.03.
120. Refer to the authority in supra note 25.
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tional, LLC2I involved the Indiana civil RICO statute, which had been
enacted by the same public law as the Indiana criminal RICO statute. 22 The
public law had contained both a criminal penalty and a civil remedy with
mandatory treble damages, mandatory reasonable attorney's fees, plus dis-
cretionary punitive damages, for committing two predicate criminal acts. 23
The Court of Appeals concluded that the RICO civil remedy was "derivative
of the criminal law" and not preempted by the Uniform Act. 24 On the other
hand, HDNET, LLC. v. North American Boxing Council125 involved the civil
conversion action given to victims of theft by the Indiana Crime Victim's
Relief Act. The civil conversion statute did not create a mandatory civil rem-
edy and had been enacted separately from the various criminal statutes with
which it interfaced.126 The Indiana Court of Appeals held that the civil con-
version statute was not derivative of the criminal statutes to which it referred.
With respect to idea misappropriation, a civil conversion remedy was pre-
empted by the Indiana enactment.127 Similar results can be expected under
the uniform versions of 1979 and 1985 subsection 7(b).
G. The Necessity of Amending Section 7
Professor John Cross has described Subsection 7(a) as containing "irrec-
oncilable ambiguity."128 He recommended amendment to more clearly and
accurately identify the law that was displaced.12 9 Professor Cross considered
that the language of Subsection 7(a) was broad enough to accommodate both
the No Uniform Act Trade Secret, No Preemption View or the Exclusive
121. AGS Capital Corp., Inc. v. Prod. Action Int'l, LLC, 884 N.E.2d 294 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008).
122. See HDNet LLC. v. N. Am. Boxing Council, 972 N.E.2d 920, 926 (Ind. Ct.
App.), transfer den., 980 N.E.2d 322 (Ind. 2012).
123. See AGS Capital, 884 N.E.2d at 308.
124. See id. But see Food Servs. of Am. Inc. v. Carrington,
CV-12-175-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 424507 at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 4, 2013) (stat-
ing that an ordinary civil anti-racketeering claim does not fall under the excep-
tion for "criminal remedies"), adhered to on denial of reconsideration,
CV-12-00175-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 3199691 at *1-2 (D. Ariz. June 24,
2013).
125. See HDNet, 972 N.E.2d at 920.
126. See id. at 926-27.
127. See id. On the other hand, the court noted that a contractual idea misappropria-
tion claim would fall within the contractual exception to preemption. See id. at
925 ("[W]e emphasize that our statute does not preempt claims for misappro-
priation of information or ideas that are protected by contract.").
128. See Cross, supra note 28, at 469.
129. See id. at 481.
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Remedy For Misappropriation of Business Information View.130 But he be-
lieved that the statute itself provided no clue as to the appropriate test.' 3' He
regarded the following 1985 Commissioners' Comment as the key to under-
standing 1985 Section 7:
This Act does not deal with criminal remedies for trade secret misappro-
priation and is not a comprehensive statement of civil remedies. It applies to
a duty to protect competitively significant secret information that is imposed
by law. It does not apply to a duty voluntarily assumed through an express or
an implied-in-fact contract. The enforceability of covenants not to disclose
trade secrets and covenants not to compete that are intended to protect trade
secrets, for example, is governed by other law. The Act also does not apply
to a duty imposed by law that is not dependent upon the existence of com-
petitively significant secret information, like an agent's duty of loyalty to his
or her principal.132
Professor Cross argued that this Comment implicitly rejected both the
No Uniform Act Trade Secret, No Preemption View and the Exclusive Rem-
edy For Misappropriation of Business Information View.133 The Comment,
for example, contained no hint of the limitations inherent in the No Uniform
Act Trade Secret, No Preemption View.34 On the other hand, Professor
Cross considered that the Exclusive Remedy for Misappropriation of Busi-
ness Information View, which he called the All Confidential Information
view,35 was too broad. He portrayed the View as "regulating any informa-
tion that a person might want to keep private. Even embarrassing, but purely
private, facts would, under this view, fall within the domain of the UTSA."136
He concluded that, under the Comment, a duty that was imposed by law
without regard to whether a trade secret existed would apply to Uniform Act
trade secrets. 137
130. See id. at 470.
131. See id. at 475.
132. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 651
(2005). The 1979 Commissioners' Comment is essentially the same. See id.
133. See Cross, supra note 28, at 476-77.
134. See id. at 476 ("The Comment strongly suggests that the Commissioners did
not intend anything remotely resembling the Trade Secrets Only view."). The
Trade Secrets Only view is Professor Cross' term for the No Uniform Act
Trade Secret, No Preemption View. See id. at 451-52.
135. See id. at 452.
136. See id. at 479.
137. See id. at 477 ("If the duty exists regardless of whether the information is se-
cret, the Comment indicates the state law is not displaced, even if the informa-
tion in question is a trade secret."). If valid, Professor Cross' conclusion would
mean that noncontractual legal claims providing different remedies for Uni-
form Act trade secrets would not conflict with the Uniform Act. Refer to supra
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But the cases that Professor Cross cited as illustrative of the All Confi-
dential Information View involved business information.138 Indeed, when de-
scribed as the Exclusive Remedy for Misappropriation of Business
Information View, this view is consistent with both the Uniform Act and the
Uniform Act's Restatement (First) roots. 139 Under this View, a majority of
courts consider that the Uniform Act preempts noncontractual legal claims
protecting business information from misappropriation, whether or not the
business information is a Uniform Act trade secret. 140 Insofar as the 1985
Commissioners' Comment to 1985 Section 7 is concerned, the Comment
does not state that a noncontractual legal claim can protect business informa-
tion from misappropriation.141 The Commissioners' Comment is consistent
notes 63-64 and accompanying text. But his conclusion is not valid. See infra
note 141 and accompanying text.
138. None of the All Confidential Information View cases that Professor Cross cited
involved private, noncommercial information. Compare id. at 452 n.32, with
Auto Channel, Inc. v. Speedvision Network, LLC, 144 F. Supp. 2d 784, 787,
794-97 (W.D. Ky. 2001) (Plaintiff businessmen sought protection for the con-
cept of a cable channel devoted to automobiles, including their business plan,
demonstrative videotape, and a list of potential sources for taped program-
ming.); Thermodyn Corp. v. 3M Co., 593 F. Supp. 2d 972, 985 (N.D. Ohio
2008) (Plaintiff, a manufacturer, sought protection for two formulas, a process,
customer lists, pricing information and marketing information.); Cardinal
Health 414, Inc. v. Adams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 967, 969-74 (M.D. Tenn. 2008)
(Former employees secretly accessed the business e-mail account of their for-
mer employer's manager for over a year.); Bliss Clearing Niagara, Inc. v. Mid-
west Brake Bond Co., 270 F. Supp. 2d 943, 944-45 (W.D. Mich. 2003)
(Plaintiff, a manufacturer, had disclosed in confidence drawings of a wet-type
industrial clutch to a parts supplier that was a secret competitor.). See also Tait
Graves, Nonpublic Information and California Tort Law: A Proposal for Har-
monizing California's Employee Mobility and Intellectual Property Regimes
Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, UCLA J.L. & TECH 1, 72 (2006) (stating
that "the development of tort law regarding personal information has nothing to
do with the policy interests raised by trade secret-type claims").
139. Refer to supra note 50-52 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., CDC Restoration & Constr., LC. v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC,
274 P.3d 317, 330 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) ("[W]e join the majority of courts that
have addressed this issue and hold that the UTSA preempts claims based on the
unauthorized use of information, irrespective of whether that information meets
the statutory definition of a trade secret.").
141. See I MILGRIM & BENSEN, supra note 66, §l.01[3][a] at 1-240.14(78) (inter-
preting the same Commissioners' Comment as implying that the Uniform Act
preempts all noncontractual legal claims protecting business information,
whether or not a Uniform Act trade secret is involved). Professor Cross' con-
trary view may have been influenced by the concluding sentence of the 1985
Commissioners' Comment which provides that "[t]he Act also does not apply
to a duty imposed by law that is not dependent upon the existence of competi-
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with the approach of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in the Mortgage
Specialists case.142 A court must ensure that noncontractual legal claims are
not used to protect business information.143
Based upon his conviction that Section 7 was flawed, Professor Cross
proposed the following revision:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), this [Act] displaces eon-
flietig tort, restitutionary, and other law of this State provid-
ing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade sere,
(2) for the acquisition, disclosure, or use of confidential infor-
mation that satisfies the requirements of Section 1 (4)(i) of
this [Act]. and
(3) for violation of a duty imposed by law based on the confi-
dential nature of the information.
(b) This [Act] does not affect:
(1) contractual remedies, whether or not based on misappre
priation of a trade secret the acquisition, disclosure, or use
of confidential information,
(2) other civil remedies that are not based on mis.pp..p.ia
tion of a trade secret based on a duty that would exist
regardless of whether the information was confidential,
(3) secondary liability for any civil remedy that is not dis-
placed by this section. or
(3) (4) criminal remedies, whether or not based upon misap-
..... i atio of a trade secret the acquisition. disclosure, or
use of confidential information.144
It is questionable whether amendments intended to provide greater clar-
ity and accuracy should introduce the undefined terms "confidential" and
tively significant secret information, like an agent's duty of loyalty to his or her
principal." UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7 cmt. (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
651 (2005). However, read carefully, this sentence merely indicates that the
Uniform Act does not prevent arising of duties imposed by law that are not
dependent upon secret business information. The sentence does not add that
these imposed duties can protect business information. Indeed, if the sentence
did indicate this, the sentence would conflict with 1979 and 1985 § 7(a) (see
supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text), and would be invalid in states that
did not enact the Commissioners' Comments. See Halifax Corp. v. First Union
Nat. Bank, 546 S.E.2d 696, 703 (Va. 2001) (Commissioners' Comments
"should not become devices for expanding the scope of ... sections."). Moreo-
ver, most states do not enact the Commissioners' Comments. See Pride Hy-
undai, Inc. v. Chrysler Fin. Co., LLC, 369 F.3d 603, 614 (1st Cir. 2004) ("Most
states ... choose not to enact the Official Commentary .. .
142. Refer to supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
143. See id.
144. See Cross, supra note 28, at 481.
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"confidential information" into Section 7. Uncertainty as to the meaning of
these terms is compounded by the American Law Institute's abandonment of
continued protection for "confidential information" following the expansion
of its definition of trade secret. 4 5 Professor Cross also rejected what he
called the judicial All Confidential Information View of Section 7 as "overly
broad."46 In any event, the heart of the matter is the interplay between pro-
posed Subsection 7(a)(2) and proposed Subsection 7(b)(2).
Proposed Subsection 7(a)(2) displaces noncontractual legal claims im-
posed by law due to the confidential nature of information. On the other
hand, proposed Subsection 7(b)(2) excepts from displacement noncontractual
claims arising from legal obligations imposed without regard to confidential
information.147 In explaining his proposal, Professor Cross indicated that
quantum meruit/unjust enrichment, tortious interference with contract, con-
spiracy, and fraud claims would not be displaced. Breach of fiduciary duty
claims rarely would be displaced.
Finally, in most cases, duty of loyalty and tortious interference with
prospective advantage claims would not be displaced. On the other hand,
International News Service misappropriation,148 conversion, and unfair com-
petition claims would be more frequently displaced and confidential informa-
tion, and breach of confidence claims ordinarily would be displaced.
Common law trade secret misappropriation alone always would be dis-
placed. 149 In summing up his proposal, Professor Cross added "As should be
apparent from the foregoing discussion, application of proposed Section 7
means that a significantly higher percentage of state law claims would likely
survive displacement than do under current case law."50
145. Refer to supra note 60 and accompanying text.
146. See Cross, supra note 28, at 479 ("[T]he All Confidential Information view is
overly broad.").
147. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
148. In Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), INS had copied
information from AP east coast newspapers and transmitted news stories based
upon the copied information to INS-affiliated west coast newspapers in compe-
tition with western affiliates of AP. A Supreme Court majority held that the
appropriation of news by a competitor for use in direct competition with the
originator was actionable unfair competition under federal common law. See id.
at 238-40. After Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) declared that
there was no general federal common law, the INS doctrine has endured only to
the extent that it has been incorporated into state law. In most of the few state
cases in which the INS misappropriation doctrine has been followed, a defen-
dant's appropriation has resulted in direct competition in a plaintiffs primary
market. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 38 cmt. c. at
413 ("Appeals to the misappropriation doctrine are almost always rejected
when the appropriation does not intrude upon the plaintiff's primary market.").
149. See Cross, supra note 28, at 483-90.
150. See id. at 490.
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Both proposed Subsection 7(a)(2) and proposed Subsection 7(b)(2) pre-
sent difficulties. Insofar as proposed Subsection 7(a)(2) is concerned, the
Uniform Act does not impose a legal duty solely because of the secret nature
of information. Actionable trade secret misappropriation requires the exis-
tence of a protectable trade secret, an act of misappropriation, and entitle-
ment to an injunction, a monetary recovery, or both.151 If, as it appears to,
proposed Subsection 7(a)(2) requires that an imposed duty be based upon the
confidential nature of information alone,152 even common law trade secret
misappropriation would not be displaced.53 With respect to proposed Sub-
section 7(b)(2), as long as a legal duty was imposed for a reason other than
protecting confidential business information from misappropriation, for ex-
ample, a manager's fiduciary duty or an employee's duty of loyalty, pro-
posed Subsection 7(b)(2) permits the legal duty to protect confidential
business information from misappropriation.154
For example, in Thermodyn Corp. v. 3M Company,'55 a federal district
court case under the Ohio enactment, the former president of a division of his
former employer and two companies that the former president formed were
sued upon several counts, including trade secret misappropriation and unjust
enrichment.156 The allegations supporting the unjust enrichment claim were
"[d]efendants have received the financial and competitive benefit of
Thermodyne's information and Thermodyne has lost its financial expectation
in developing and capitalizing upon its trade secret information."17 The fed-
eral district judge applied the majority Exclusive Remedy for Misappropria-
tion of Business Information View and held that the unjust enrichment claim
was preempted by the Ohio enactment. 58 Because unjust enrichment dam-
151. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(2), (4), 2, 3 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
537-634 (2005).
152. See Cross, supra note 28, at 487 (stating that proposed § 7(a)(2) wouldnot dis-
place quantum meruit/unjust enrichment claims because "the duty does not
arise out of the fact of secrecy itself').
153. See id. at 481 (detailing the proposed statute providing that displacement re-
quires satisfaction of both proposed subsection 7 (a)(l) and proposed subsection
7(a)(2)). Like the Uniform Act, actionable common-law trade secret misappro-
priation requires an act of misappropriation and entitlement to a remedy in
addition to the secrecy of the business information involved. See Klitzke, supra
note 13, at 277-78 (stating that common-law trade secret misappropriation re-
quires a trade secret, misappropriation, and an available remedy).
154. Refer to supra note 137 and accompanying text.
155. Thermodyn Corp. v. 3M Co., 593 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
156. See id. at 977-78, 985, 990.
157. See id. at 990.
158. See id.
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ages are recoverable for Uniform Act trade secret misappropriation,159 major-
ity approach courts frequently have found noncontractual legal claims for
unjust enrichment preempted. 60 However, under Professor Cross' proposed
revision of Section 7, the unjust enrichment claim in Thermodyne Corp.
would not be preempted. According to Professor Cross, the duty involved in
an unjust enrichment claim arises from unfairness and not from the secrecy
of information.61
Professor Cross recommended a number of changes in the wording of
1985 subsection 7(b).162 His major substantive recommendation was pro-
posed subsection 7(b)(2), which has been discussed.163 He also recommended
adding a new subsection 7(b)(3) stating that the Uniform Act does not affect
"secondary liability for any civil remedy that is not displaced by this sec-
tion."164 His rationale was:
[N]ew § 7(b)(3) explicitly deals with secondary liability. A few
courts have struggled to determine if §7 has any bearing on claims
for secondary liability. Under the proposal, displacement of a sec-
ondary liability claim would go hand-in-hand with displacement
of the primary claim. If the primary claim is displaced, there is no
secondary liability as a matter of law. But the proposed section
provides that if the primary claim is not displaced, secondary lia-
bility will always remain available. This explicit term is included
for practical reasons; namely to save the courts the trouble of di-
vining whether the true nature of secondary liability is an indepen-
dent tort or an appendage to the primary tort. 165
Professor Cross cited as illustrative of "secondary liability" Thola v.
Henschell,166 a Washington state appellate court case dealing with a new em-
ployer's vicarious liability for trade secret misappropriation by a former em-
159. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 3(a) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 633-34
(2005); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7(a), 14 U.L.A. 542 (1979) (providing
that damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and
the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account
in computing actual loss).
160. See Cross, supra note 28, at 461 (stating that "most courts" displace non-con-
tractual claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment).
161. See id. at 487.
162. Refer to supra note 144 and accompanying text. For example, he recommended
substituting "the acquisition, disclosure, or use of confidential information," a
paraphrase of the definition of "misappropriation," for "misappropriation of a
trade secret." See id.
163. Refer to supra notes 147-61 and accompanying text.
164. See Cross, supra note 28, at 481.
165. See id. at 482-83.
166. See id. at 482 n. 120.
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ployee of the plaintiff. This signaled that by "secondary liability" Professor
Cross primarily meant "vicarious liability."67 Yet, Thola suggests that the
proposed amendment is unnecessary. Thola followed the trend of authority
holding that vicarious liability is not displaced by the Uniform Act.168
From a broader perspective, the present majority approach preempting
non-contractual legal claims to the extent that they are used to protect busi-
ness information from misappropriation169 assures more uniform treatment of
business information. Focusing upon a defendant's breach of fiduciary duty
or breach of the duty of loyalty, as Professor Cross recommended, could lead
courts to punish defendants for having revealed or used information regard-
less of its secrecy.170 A compelling case for amending Section 7 has not been
made. 171
IV. CONCLUSION
Amendment of Section 7 is not required. The trend of the case law is
positive. Future difficulty can be avoided and proper preemption achieved if
the courts focus upon the heart of the Uniform Act, the Subsection 1(4)(i)
definition of "trade secret."72 Like the Restatement (First) of Torts from
which it was derived,173 this definition makes business information with ac-
tual or potential value derived from secrecy the sine qua non for protection
from misappropriation.
The function of Section 7 is to prevent noncontractual legal claims from
protecting business information. Preemption of these noncontractual legal
claims is necessary for the Uniform Act to substitute its "unitary definitions
167. See id.
168. See Thola v. Henschell, 164 P.3d 524, 527-29 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) and
Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Uniform Trade Secrets Act-Trends and Prospects, 33
HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 428-32 (2010) (reconciling the doctrine of respondeat
superior with the Uniform Act). The principal contrary authority is an Indiana
Supreme Court decision holding that vicarious liability doctrine is displaced by
the Uniform Act. See Infinity Prods., Inc. v. Quandt, 810 N.E.2d 1028, 1034
(Ind. 2004).
169. See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text.
170. See Lemley, supra note 1, at 343-44 (stating that courts that ignore the secrecy
requirement "undermine the purpose of trade secret law").
171. See Ashley Dillon, An Immodest Proposal: How the Kansas Supreme Court
Can Unify the Uniform Trade Secret Act's Preemption of Common Law
Claims, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 1147, 1168-71, 1178 (2012) (arguing that judicial
recognition that the Uniform Act establishes standards for the protection from
misappropriation of all business information, whether or not the information
qualifies as a Uniform Act trade secret, will produce uniformity).
172. Refer to supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
173. Refer to supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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of trade secret and trade secret misappropriation, and a single statute of limi-
tations for the various property, quasi-contractual, and violation of fiduciary
relationship theories of noncontractual liability utilized at common law."' 174
174. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A.
531 (2005).
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